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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost 1,500 years ago, a large mosaic was created in the apse of
the Church of the Panagia Kanakaria in Lythrankomi, Cyprus.' The mo-
saic, depicting Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and two archangels, was sur-
rounded by a fresco of the twelve apostles.2 As is traditional in the
Greek Orthodox Church, the congregation in this small north Cypriot
town came to revere the mosaic as a holy relic. Unfortunately, the
priests and congregation of the Panagia Kanakaria Church were forced to
flee Lythrankomi in 1976 by the occupying Turkish army.4 Sometime in
the following twelve years, the sacred mosaic was torn from its place in
the church and smashed into four separate pieces. 5 It made its way into
an Indiana art gallery where it was later discovered by a representative of
the legitimate government of Cyprus.6
Though this sounds like a fantastic story of international intrigue, it
is one of many that make up the third most profitable criminal market in
the world: the black market in art and antiquities.7 The mosaic falls into
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1. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,
917 F.2d 278, 279 (7th Cir. 1990).
2. Id.
3. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,
717 F. Supp. 1374, 1396 (S.D. Ind. 1989), arid, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
4. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 917 F.2d at 280-81.
5. Id. at 281-84.
6. Id.
7. Ashton Hawkins, Richard A. Rothman & David B. Goldstein, A Tale of Two Innocents:
Creating an Equitable Balance Between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers
of Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 49 n.2 (1995) (citing William Tuohy, Picture This: Art
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a class of objects called cultural property-tangible objects of a culture's
unique heritage and traditions. It includes all "property which, on reli-
gious or secular grounds, is ... of importance for archaeology, prehis-
tory, history, literature, art or science."
8
Although the black market crosses national boundaries,9 U.S. law is
of great importance because the United States is a major consumer of
cultural property.' ° While policymakers and courts both recognize the
importance of the United States in this black market," laws are strikingly
inconsistent in their treatment of cultural property. 2 Once a piece of
cultural property reaches the United States, its legal treatment will de-
pend on the diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and the object's
country of origin, 13 the particular type of object, 14 the scienter of the cur-
rent possessor of the piece,15 and other factors. This patchwork of regu-
Thievery is Thriving, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1994, at HI). Art theft worldwide is estimated at $2
billion annually. Id.
8. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Trans-
fer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter UNESCO
Convention].
9. International regulation takes place through the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT), which promote international treaties and uniform laws respectively. See UNITED
NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., APPROVED PROGRAMME & BUDGET 2008-2009, at
133-34, UNESCO Doc. 34 C/5 (2008), http://unesco.org (setting forth guidelines and plans of action
that will be used to implement the conventions and declarations adopted by UNESCO); Statute of
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law art. 1, Mar. 15, 1940, 15 U.S.T. 2494
(declaring UNIDROIT's purpose of drafting, establishing, and facilitating uniform legislation in the
field of private law). Various countries also have their own laws in place. See, e.g., Convention on
Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-13 (2006); Reglamento para el Uso y
Conservaci6n de las Areas, Objetos y Colecciones de Palacio Nacional [Regulations for the Use and
Conservation of Places, Objects and Collections] Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 14 de
Noviembre de 2000 (Mex.).
10. "The United States is a principal market for articles of archaeological and ethnological
interest and of art objects .... S. REP. No. 97-564, at 23 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4078, 4100; see also United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 992 n.l (5th Cir. 1977) (characterizing
the United States as an importer of ancient, oriental, and primitive art); John Henry Merryman,
Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1881, 1893 (1985) (characterizing the United
States as a major art importing country in terms of the UNESCO Convention).
I1. See McClain, 545 F.2d at 994 ("The apparent purpose of Congress in enacting stolen prop-
erty statutes was to discourage both the receiving of stolen goods and the initial taking." (emphasis
added)); Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430-31 (N.Y. 1991) (recogniz-
ing New York City's central role in the international art market).
12. See infra Part II.
13. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C §§ 2601-13 (2006).
14. See 19 U.S.C. § 2092.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2314; Guggenheim Found., 569 N.E.2d at 429 (discussing the good faith pur-
chaser rule).
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lation leads to innocent purchasers losing valuable objects because there
is no predictable way to evaluate title to cultural property.
16
The ancient relics from the Panagia Kanakaria Church were re-
turned to the Church of Cyprus thanks to the Cypriot government's ex-
traordinary efforts.17 However, similar cultural property is not always
returned.' 8  This Comment recommends that Congress take action to
bring consistency to the treatment of cultural property in two ways.
First, ownership disputes should be settled based on the quality of prove-
nance between competing claimants, a system similar to land title regis-
tration. Provenance is the history of a piece of cultural property that
shows where it came from and where it has been.' 9 Second, to ensure
provenance is a complete guide to title all cultural objects, both illegally
exported and stolen cultural property should receive the same treatment.
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of cultural property
regulation. Next, Part III addresses the current state of the law protecting
cultural objects within the United States and explains the inconsistencies
created under the current statutory scheme. Finally, Part IV proposes a
solution that will protect interested parties.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
Theft, and theft of cultural property, has gone on for all of history. 0
In antiquity, pillage of cultural property went hand-in-hand with the con-
quest of new territory. 21 Indeed, empires like Rome reaped huge boun-
ties from defeated peoples and viewed the taking of their art as a legiti-
16. See, e.g., Guggenheim Found., 569 N.E.2d 426; O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J.
1980).
17. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,
917 F.2d 278, 294 (7th Cir. 1990).
18. See, e.g., Tajan v. Pavia & Harcourt, 693 N.Y.S.2d 544, 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (noting
Italy's failure to intervene in a customs seizure and the subsequent release of the painting at issue to
another party).
19. 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 710 (2d ed. 1989).
20. LEONARD D. DUBOFF ET AL., THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW D-1 (2d ed. Mar. 2005) ("Since
the earliest times"); Hawkins et al., supra note 7, at 49; see also LAW: A TREASURY OF ART AND
LITERATURE 20-22 (Sara Robbins ed., Beaux Arts ed. 1990).
21. DuBOFF ET AL., supra note 20, at D-l (discussing the legitimacy of conquest from the
Roman perspective). "[C]onquerors took the cultural property of the losers, in the belief that the
mana, or cultural identity and strength of the conquered, was embodied in those objects." Merry-
man, supra note 10, at 1914.
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22mate aspect of war. That practice continued unabated through the
eighteenth century.23
While the plundering of cultural property from conquered nations
faded almost completely in the eighteenth century, Napoleon enthusiasti-
cally resumed the practice in the nineteenth.24 The emperor filled his
Mus6e Napol6on first with objects taken from the First and Second Es-
25 2tates, and later with objects from the defeated cultures of Europe.26
Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo brought a temporary end to the ap-
propriation of cultural property as spoils of war, and the victors at Water-
loo respected the integrity of Europe's cultural heritage with certain no-
table exceptions. 27 At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, cultural national-
ism rationalized the allies' repatriation of cultural property taken by Na-
poleon.28
Cultural nationalism is the idea that objects which are made by and
for a particular people, and which are identified with that people, belong
to and with them.29  Although it represented an improvement from the
previous might-makes-right approach to cultural property, cultural na-
tionalism is subject to the same distortions because it too is based in na-
tionalism.3° Condemnation of takings in wartime became universal
22. DUBOFF ET AL., supra note 20, at D-1; Charles De Visscher, International Protection of
Works of Art and Historic Monuments, DOCUMENTS & ST. PAPERS, June 1949, at 821, 823
("Rome... had made a systematic practice of carrying off the works of art belonging to the peoples
subjugated by her.").
23. Jaroslav Folda, Art in the Latin East, 1098-1291, in THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY
OF THE CRUSADES 151 (Jonathan Riley-Smith ed., 1995); DONALD E. QUELLER, THE FOURTH
CRUSADE: THE CONQUEST OF CONSTANTINOPLE 1201-1204, at 149 (1977); Jonathan Riley-Smith,
The State of Mind of Crusaders to the East, 1095-1300, in THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF
THE CRUSADES, supra, at 75. But see De Visscher, supra note 22, at 823 (the practice was reestab-
lished with the Renaissance).
24. De Visscher, supra note 22, at 824-25.
25. Cecil Gould, Trophy of Conquest, in LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 2 (John Henry
Merryman & Albert E. Elsen eds., 4th ed. Kluwer Law Int'l 2002). The First Estate, the clergy, and
the Second Estate, the nobility, of course, had the most and best property to take. See HISTORICAL
DICTIONARY OF NAPOLEONIC FRANCE, 1799-1815, at 173 (Owen Connelly ed., 1985).
26. De Visscher, supra note 22, at 824-26 (specifically noting confiscation practices in the
conquest of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany); Dorothy Mackay Quynn, Art Confisca-
tions of the Napoleonic Wars, in LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS, supra note 25, at 4, 7-8;
Gould, supra note 25, at 2-4.
27. JUDITH G. COFFIN ET. AL., WESTERN CIVILIZATIONS 720 (14th ed. 2002) (discussing Napo-
leon's defeat at the battle of Waterloo, June 15-18, 1815); De Visscher, supra note 22, at 826 (dis-
cussing the peace negotiations and the return of art confiscated by Napoleon).
28. See De Visscher, supra note 22, at 826 (discussing motivations consonant with what would
become known as cultural nationalism).
29. See generally Merryman, supra note 10, at 1911-12.
30. Examples include Napoleon's use of the Mus6e Napol6on as a propaganda symbol and
Hitler's view of Aryans as the only fit race. HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF NAPOLEONIC FRANCE,
supra note 25, at 310-11; Quynn, supra note 26, at 5; DUBOFF ET AL., supra note 20, at D-19; De
Visscher, supra note 22, at 825.
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among great thinkers in Europe and the United States, 3' with this new
idealism focusing on protecting cultural objects for the glory of the cul-
tures that created them.32 The allies at Waterloo promoted this new view
in an attempt to protect the national prestige of the previously defeated
nations by halting the appropriation of cultural property as an aspect of
conquest.
33
Cultural nationalism shifted from a nascent movement to a full-
fledged goal of the allied victors of World War I. The collective treaties
ending the Great War stipulated that cultural objects disbursed by time or
by war should be repatriated.34  Additionally, preference in repatriation
was given to the country that controlled the region to which a cultural
object's significance belonged.35 The treaties ending World War I had
significant sections dedicated to the return of cultural property acquired
under a wide variety of circumstances.
36
The darker side of cultural nationalism surfaced during World War
II, and the pattern of Napoleon repeated itself.37 The Third Reich used
the conquest of "subhumans ','38 as an opportunity for acquiring cultural
property. Hitler was famously interested in art and was himself a failed
artist.39 The German government saw itself as protecting the art of other
countries, selectively confiscating pieces that fit Hitler's political ideals
and selling or ignoring the rest.40 Modern art was most notable among
the "degenerate" forms Hitler directed be destroyed.4 1
The end to World War II marked the beginning of the current era in
the protection of cultural property, one based on cultural international-
ism, or the idea that cultural objects contribute to the collective culture of
31. De Visscher, supra note 22, at 825-27 (citing examples of vocal opponents as Quartrem&re
de Quincy and Daunou).
32. See id. at 826.
33. See id.
34. See id at 829.
35. Id. This is, again, cultural nationalism at work. See Merryman, supra note 10, at 1911-12.
Certain objects did, however, make their way into international trade as a result of the peace. Exam-
ples include the wings of the polyptych of the Mystic Lamb and the outer panels of The Last Supper
(by Dierick Bouts). De Visscher, supra note 22, at 829-30.
36. See De Visscher, supra note 22, at 828-37 (discussing the postwar return of cultural prop-
erty).
37. DuBOFF ET AL., supra note 20, at D-19. Hitler's actions can be viewed as cultural national-
ism run amuck, which may contribute to the explanation of why cultural internationalism became so
widely accepted by the parties involved in the direct aftermath of World War 11.
38. COFFIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 1005-14.
39. Id. at 970.
40. DuBOFF ET AL., supra note 20, at D- 19-20.
41. Id. at D-20.
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mankind and so equally belong to everyone. 42 This new ideal was ex-
pressed in the text of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954 Hague Convention)43 and
the founding of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO). 44 The 1954 Hague Convention ratified what
had been the norm for centuries in western warfare, violated only by Na-
poleon and Hitler-that destruction of cultural property during wartime
should be avoided when militarily possible and that the pillage of cul-
tural property was not a legitimate component of war. 45 The 1954 Con-
vention directs for the protection of cultural property in the signatory
parties' own territory,46 for cooperation with local authorities in protect-
ing cultural property in the occupied territory, 47 and for avoiding the de-
struction of, or damage to, cultural property as a result of military ac-
tion.48 Seizing cultural objects as spoils of war is also prohibited.49
A peacetime complement to the 1954 Hague Convention, the
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
(UNESCO Convention), was completed in 1970.5o The UNESCO Con-
vention dealt with private acts of cultural property theft, directing im-
plementing nations to prevent the importation of cultural property taken
illicitly from other signatory nations.51  The UNESCO Convention re-
quired signatory nations to pass laws preventing the illegal trade of cul-
tural property, 52 regulating the legal trade of cultural property with signa-
42. See generally Merryman, supra note 10, at 1916-17; Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict pmbl., opened for signature May 14, 1954, 249
U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention].
43. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 42. The 1954 Hague Convention was another install-
ment in a series of similar international conventions that had occurred over the preceding six dec-
ades. De Visscher, supra note 22, at 837. The first Hague Conference took place in 1899; it pro-
tected historic monuments from destruction in war. Id. The second Hague Conference in 1907
adopted similar rules for naval confrontations. Id.
44. UNESCO was founded on November 16, 1945, after a conference which grew out of the
Allies concern about the destruction wrought by Nazi Germany. UNESCO, The Organization's
History, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURLID=6207&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTIO
N=20 1.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
45. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 42, res. 11.
46. Id. art. 3.
47. Id art. 5.
48. Id. arts. 5, 7.
49. Id. art. 14.
50. UNESCO Convention, supra note 8.
51. Id. arts. 2-3 ("recogniz[ing] that the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of
cultural property is one of the main causes of the impoverishment of... cultural heritage" and pro-
scribing such actions); S. REP. No. 97-564, at 22 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078,
4099.
52. UNESCO Convention, supra note 8, art. 5.
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tory nations,53 and protecting the cultural property of signatory nations
whose property was in danger of pillage.54 The UNESCO Convention
also outlawed the surrender of cultural property as a consequence of
55
war.
These treaties make cultural property theft a clear violation of in-
ternational law. But the world has changed, and countries are no longer
the primary thieves of cultural property. Looters, and those individuals
to whom they sell, are now the chief cause of cultural theft. For exam-
ple, during the Invasion of Iraq in 2003, it was not the invading power,
the United States, that looted cultural property throughout the country,
but the Iraqi people themselves: professional thieves who knew exactly
what was worth taking and how to get it.56  Facing this new, insidious
black market for cultural property demands a new legislative response in
the United States that recognizes individuals, not states, as the primary
actors in cultural property theft.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S. LAW
Cultural property regulation in the United States has generally mir-
rored international trends. The relatively short history of the United
States, however, makes it somewhat unique.57 The United States has
historically "[flocus[ed] on a relatively short segment of what might oth-
erwise be considered its history," 58 ignoring the Native American cul-
tures that were on what is now U.S. territory long before 1607. Native
American culture' is commonly considered distinct from that of the
United States.59
53. Id. arts. 6-8.
54. Id. art. 9. This article provides the enabling language for the creation of the CPIA dis-
cussed in Part III.C.
55. UNESCO Convention, supra note 8, art. 11.
56. John F. Bums, A Nation at War: Looting; Pillagers Strip Iraqi Museum of its Treasure,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, at A 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/13/world/a-nation-
at-war-looting-pillagers-strip-iraqi-museum-of-its-treasure.html.
57. France traces its independence to the breakup of the Holy Roman Empire in 843. COFFIN
ET AL., supra note 27, at 294. England traces its history back to William the Conqueror, who arrived
on the island in 1066. Id. at 328-29. Russia's modem history began with the rise of Ivan III (the
Great) and his crowning as the first czar in 1480. Id. at 410. And China is perhaps the oldest of all,
tracing its unification back to 222 BC, under its first Emperor, Chhin Shih Huang Ti. I JOSEPH
NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILISATION IN CHINA 98 (1954). However, while all of these countries
had been occupied by the same people who would later form the aforementioned nations for hun-
dreds of years prior to political unification and independence, the United States' independence in
1776 was declared by a people who had only resided in the country only since 1607, the founding of
Jamestown. COFFIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 574, 624.
58. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,
917 F.2d 278, 297 (7th Cir. 1990).
59. For example, there is a National Museum of the American Indian separate from the Na-
tional Museum of American History among the various museums of the Smithsonian Institute.
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With the international environment for cultural property regulation
now established, this Part addresses the major laws protecting cultural
property in the United States, in roughly chronological order. First, the
Antiquities Act of 1906 protects real property from a distinctly national-
ist perspective. Second, the Pre-Columbian Art Act of 1972 restricts the
importation of certain artifacts; it was the first attempt to address the is-
sues most relevant to this Comment. Third, as the enabling legislation
for the UNESCO Convention, the CPIA has a unique and important
place in cultural property regulation. Fourth, the NSPA, while not en-
acted specifically to protect cultural property, is important in the arena
today because of its potential criminal sanctions. And finally, common
law actions may be invoked by private parties.
A. Cultural Nationalism: the Antiquities Act of 1906
The United States' first law aimed at the protection of cultural
property 6° was the Antiquities Act of 1906.61 The Act was born of a
failed effort to protect the Casa Grande Ruins in Arizona, a major Native
American site, and Mount Vernon in Virginia, the home of George
Washington.62 Prior to the Antiquities Act, a private movement had
sought to protect Mt. Vernon, and title was offered to both the federal
government and the State of Virginia, but neither was interested in pres-
63ervation. Instead, title ended up in the hands of the ad hoc Mount
Vernon Ladies' Association, which still owns the property today.64 It
was not until vandals damaged the Casa Grande Ruins, however, that
Congress finally responded with the Antiquities Act.65
The Antiquities Act focuses on real property and structures owned
by the United States and allows the President to create historic land-
marks.66 It authorizes the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and
Defense to issue permits for scientific or educational work, 67 and creates
a criminal penalty of up to a $500 fine or up to ninety days imprisonment
for theft of objects or damage to anything on the land.68 The narrow
Compare National Museum of the American Indian, http://www.nmai.si.edu (last visited Apr. 6,
2009), with National Museum of American Culture, http://americanhistory.si.edu (last visited Apr. 6,
2009).
60. H.R. REP. No. 96-1457, at 18 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6378, 6381.
61. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33 (2006).
62. H.R. REP. No. 96-1457, at 18, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6380-81.
63. Id
64. Id.
65. H.R. REP. No. 96-1457, at 18, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6381. Congress also chartered the
Archaeological Institute of America at the same time. Id.
66. 16 U.S.C. §431.
67. Id. § 432.
68. Id. § 433.
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scope and minimal penalties, however, make the Act incapable of pro-
tecting most cultural property.
In the decades following the Antiquities Act, the United States con-
tinued to regard protection of cultural property as an exclusively nation-
alist enterprise. 69  Federal action was limited to protecting properties
identified as "nationally significant." 70  In the 1930s, for example, the
Works Progress Administration, a New Deal program, hired archeolo-
gists and laborers to do historic preservation in the Midwest. Around the
same time, the Historic Sites Act of 1935 directed the National Park Ser-
vice to begin "identifying and evaluating nationally significant proper-
ties. ' '71 Even after World War II, the United States did not join the grow-
ing movement toward cultural internationalism: The U.S. failed to ratify
72
the 1954 Hague Convention.
B. The Pre-Columbian Art Act of 1972: A Changing Attitude
The United States first demonstrated its interest in the preservation
of other cultures' heritage with the Pre-Columbian Art Act of 1972,
which prohibited the importation of pre-Columbian artifacts from the
Indian cultures of the Americas.73 The Act demonstrates a shift away
from cultural nationalism because it pertains exclusively to objects of
other nations and it prohibits the import of any artifact which does not
have an accompanying export permit from its country of origin.74 The
Act protects items that have been placed on a list created by the Secretar-
ies of the Treasury and of State and includes "stone carvings and wall
art" significant to pre-Columbian Indian cultures. 7 The listed items are
proscribed from importation into the United States.76
However, the Act has two flaws which make it largely insignificant
today. First, it is narrow in scope, applying only to "pre-Columbian
monumental or architectural sculpture or mural" identified by the Secre-
69. H.R. REP. No. 96-1457, at 19-20, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6382-83.
70. ld
71. H.R. REP. No. 96-1457, at 18, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6385 (emphasis added).
72. The Senate finally ratified the 1954 Hague Convention on September 25, 2008. 1954
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, concluded
on May 14, 1954, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-1 (A) (2008); Conventions, http://erc.unesco.org/cp/conv
ention.asp?KO=13637&language=E (going into force in the U.S. on June 13, 2009).
73. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-95 (2006).
74. See Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-13 (2006);
National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (2006). Note, the title National Stolen
Property Act was revoked in 1940, but will be used in this Comment for ease of reference. See id §
2314.
75. 19 U.S.C. § 2091.
76. Id.
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taries.77 Artifacts that are not part of the actual monumental structure,
such as tools or movable property, and artifacts from new sites that could
be discovered and looted before their sculpture and murals could be cata-
logued and identified by U.S. authorities, are unprotected. Second, the
Act provids only forfeiture of proscribed items as a remedy.78 Thus, there
is little deterrent effect. The Act's ineffectiveness is emphasized by the
fact that Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicara-
gua, and Peru have all gone through the more arduous process of enter-
ing into agreements under the Cultural Property Implementation Act
(CPIA) to protect their cultural heritage.79
C. Cultural Internationalism: UNESCO and the
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act
In 1972, the United States finally joined the rest of the international
community in protecting cultural property by ratifying the UNESCO
Convention.80  Although ratification would ostensibly have made the
United States a leader in preventing the destruction of objects of cultural
heritage, the Convention was not self-executing and had little effect
without domestic legislation. 81 In considering such legislation, Congress
identified the growing market in the United States as a leading cause of
destruction and pillage in foreign countries, a problem that strained rela-
tions with art-exporting allies.82 In 1982, after a series of failed bills and
lengthy consultations with market experts, the Convention on Cultural
Property Implementation Act (CPIA) finally gave effect to the UNESCO
Convention in the United States.83
The CPIA has two distinct provisions. First, it prohibits the impor-
tation of any stolen cultural property identified as part of "the inventory
of a museum, a religious or public monument, or a similar institution in
any State Party., 84 Second, it allows the President to enter into agree-
77. Id. § 2092.
78. Id. § 2093.
79. See infra Part II1.C.
80. UNESCO Convention, supra note 8. Absence from such agreements had been a trend for
the United States. First, Paris was divested of the cultural property she plundered during the Napo-
leonic wars by the Treaty of Paris, but the U.S. was not a member of the allied powers who defeated
Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815. See supra note 25. Later, the Central Powers were stripped of much
cultural property by the treaties ending World War I, but those treaties were never ratified by the
Senate. ALAN SHARP, THE VERSAILLES SETTLEMENT: PEACEMAKING IN PARIS, 1919, 39-40
(1991); De Visscher, supra note 22, at 829.
81. S. REP. No. 97-564, at 21 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4098.
82. Id.
83. S. REP. No. 97-564, at 21-24, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4098; Convention on Cultural Prop-
erty Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (2006).
84. 19 U.S.C. § 2607. A State Party is a party to the UNESCO Convention. Id. at § 2601(9).
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ments absolutely proscribing the import of cultural property from nations
he identifies as being in danger of loss of cultural property through pil-
lage. 85 These agreements prohibit any object which has been exported
from a signatory state from being brought into the United States without
a certificate of export from the signatory state.86 Nations with which the
United States has current agreements are Bolivia, Cambodia, Colombia,
Cyprus (both governments), El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy,
Mali, Nicaragua, and Peru.
8 7
The second provision of the CPIA has a tremendous advantage over
acts like the Pre-Columbian Art Act and the National Stolen Property
Act because the CPIA proscribes the importation to the United States of
cultural property which is exported from another country without a cer-
tificate of authorization from the country.8 8 This higher level of protec-
tion, distinguished from the more narrow prohibition of importation of
cultural property stolen from museums and similar institutions of signa-
tory countries, arises only if the President enters into an agreement with
the originating nation. 89 This Comment seeks to make this second aspect
of the CPIA universal in U.S. law.
For the President to enter protective agreements under the CPIA,
five conditions must be satisfied.90 First, the country seeking protection
for its cultural property must be a party to the UNESCO Convention.9'
Second, the President must find that the cultural property of that country
is at risk of pillage. 92 Third, the country must have "taken measures con-
sistent with" the UNESCO Convention.9 3 Fourth, the Act's provisions
must be both effective and as non-invasive as possible in protecting the
country's cultural heritage. 94 Finally, such restrictions must be "consis-
tent with the general interest of the international community in the inter-
change of cultural property among nations for scientific, cultural, and
85. Id. § 2602.
86. Id. § 2606.
87. U.S. State Dep't Bureau of Educ. and Cultural Affairs, Chart of Emergency Actions &
Bilateral Agreements, http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/chart.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
88. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2606 (West 2009).
89. Compare id. § 2606(a) with id. § 2607. Presumably, the signatory state would not issue
such a certificate if the object had been stolen prior to export, effectively restricting import of both
stolen and illegally exported cultural property.
90. Id. § 2602.
91. Id. § 2602(a)(1).
92. Id. § 2602(a)(1)(A).
93. Id. § 2602(a)(l)(B).
94. Id. § 2602(a)(1)(C).
Seattle University Law Review
educational purposes . . . . These determinations are intended to be
made with "a measure of Presidential judgment.,
96
The wide scope of the CPIA makes it an excellent model for the
United States when dealing with cultural property. The CPIA recognizes
the value of cultural property as part of our common heritage across bor-
ders and ethnic groups and seeks partnerships with art exporting nations
to protect those objects. Under the CPIA, the Executive Branch is also
active in seeking these partnerships. 97 However, like the Pre-Columbian
Art Act, the CPIA is a customs act without criminal sanctions. Because
the CPIA provides only for forfeiture of objects imported illegally,
criminal prosecutions tend to be brought not under the CPIA but under
the National Stolen Properties Act (NSPA).98
D. A Second Track: The NSPA
The NSPA was passed in 1919 as the National Motor Vehicle Theft
Act and was intended not to protect cultural property but to catch thieves
who were thwarting justice by crossing state boundaries. 99 The Act
makes it illegal to transport "goods, wares, merchandise, securities or
money, of the value of $5,000 or more" in interstate commerce if they
have been taken illegally. l00 Congress used the term "interstate com-
merce" to give the statute the same broad reach as the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 01 Today, a broad range of criminal
activities are prosecuted under the NSPA, including the importation of
stolen cultural property into the United States.
10 2
The word "stolen" in the NSPA has been interpreted to apply to ob-
jects which are taken or acquired wrongly both within and without the
United States but not to objects which are exported from a foreign coun-
try in violation of that country's law. 10 3 Through this interpretation, the
United States will impose criminal sanctions on violators of both domes-
95. Id. § 2602(a)(1)(D).
96. S. REP. No. 97-564, at 27 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4104.
97. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for a list of agreements the U.S. has entered into
as a result of the authority granted to the President and the Cultural Property Advisory Committee
under the CPIA for the acquisition of cultural property, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602, 2603, 2605.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 395, 409 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[P]assage of the
CPIA does not limit the NSPA's application to antiquities stolen in foreign nations.").
99. McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 649-50 (1982).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2006).
101. McElroy, 455 U.S. at 651-53.
102. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 409.
103. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 994-96 (5th Cir. 1977). The McClain court
recited that "'stealing' is commonly used to denote any dishonest transaction whereby one person
obtains that which rightfully belongs to another and deprives the owner of the rights and benefits of
ownership." Id. at 995.
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tic and foreign laws regarding theft or wrongful conversion by prosecut-
ing those who bring the stolen objects into the U.S., but will not impose
the same criminal sanctions for similar violations of foreign customs
laws. 0 4 Instead, importers of objects which were illegally exported from
their country of origin face only seizure of objects that fall under either
the Pre-Columbian Art Act or a Presidential agreement under the CPIA.
This judicial interpretation of the NSPA is an impediment to what is oth-
erwise one of the most effective laws protecting cultural property in the
United States. As a criminal statute, the NSPA has one of the strongest
deterrent effects, with conviction resulting in a fine and imprisonment of
up to ten years
0 5 in addition to forfeiture.
10
6
E. Common Law Actions
Apart from these federal laws, two common law actions are avail-
able as civil remedies for wronged owners: replevin,'0 7 an action for re-
turn of personal property, and trover, 10 8 an action for damages measured
by the value of the property taken. Replevin is the primary common law
remedy because cultural objects are non-fungible; it is the objects them-
selves that are desirable, not the monetary value associated with them.
Despite being a common law remedy, replevin is a source of conflict
among the states.
At common law, claims of ownership are conflicts of relative
merit; 10 9 they usually involve disputes between what will be called le-
gitimate owners, or owners, and current possessors, or possessors. For
the purposes of this Comment, legitimate owners are individuals or enti-
ties whose claim to ownership predates the possession at issue, who can
demonstrate a better chain of title to an object, and who never transferred
title.'1 0 Legitimate owners' possession can either be actual, as in the case
of the creator of a work of art, or constructive, as in a declaration of na-
104. Id. at 996. A middle ground does exist, however, when a state demands that any cultural
property that was illegally exported be forfeited and subject to the NSPA. United States v. Pre-
Columbian Artifacts, 845 F. Supp. 544, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1993); McClain, 545 F.2d at 1000-01.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2006).
106. See, e.g., Pre-Columbian Artifacts, 845 F. Supp. at 547 (denying motion to dismiss forfei-
ture claim).
107. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1325 (8th ed. 2004).
108. Id. at 1545.
109. See Armory v. Delamirie, (1721) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.), reprinted in JESSE
DUKEMINIER ET. AL., PROPERTY 96 (6th ed. 2006); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra, at 97-98 (quoting
Anderson v. Gouldberg, 53 N.W. 636 (Minn. 1892)).
110. The use of the word "legitimate" in legitimate owners should not be understood as a nor-
mative judgment about the merits of the two parties. Rather, it is used to provide clarity between the
two terms. Legitimate owners in one dispute may be current possessors of the same object in an-
other dispute.
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tional ownership of all undiscovered antiquities within a country."' In
contrast, current possessors are those individuals or entities whose pos-
session comes later in time and who tend to have a more ambiguous
chain of title. These possessors have not necessarily acted wrongly; they
may be good faith possessors-for example, someone who purchased an
object and was led to believe the piece was originally from a private col-
lection. 1 l2 While legitimate owners can sometimes fully trace their titles,
current possessors never can because somewhere along the current pos-
sessor's chain of title the property was acquired without the full rights of
ownership. Thus, because transfers of cultural property, like all transfers
of property, follow the latin maxim nemo plus juris ad alium transferre
potest quam ipse habet-no one can transfer more right from himself
than he has," 13 current possessors' claims of title are limited. However,
these possessors' titles can mature into good titles through the operation
of adverse possession, statutes of limitations, and laches.' 14
Adverse possession, statutes of limitations, and laches all perform
essentially the same function: each grants a current possessor full legal
title some specified period of time after the legitimate owner's action
accrues, or "come[s] into existence as an enforceable claim or right.""' 15
There are two competing approaches in the U.S. to setting this accrual
date: the demand and refusal rule and the discovery rule.
1. The Demand and Refusal Rule
A leading case on the demand and refusal rule is the New York
Court of Appeals case of Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v.
Lubell.116 In Guggenheim, the Guggenheim Museum initiated an action
for replevin of a Chagall gouache that it believed had been stolen by a
111. E g., United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974) ("Under [Guate-
malan] law, all such artifacts are the property of the Republic, and may not be removed without
permission of the government.").
112. The general scheme described is not unusual. See 77 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 259
(2008).
113. The translation is my own.
114. While there is potential in the laches defense, it is not analyzed in either of the cases dis-
cussed here and will, therefore, not be addressed. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell,
569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991) (discussing that some arguments may apply to a laches defense
when considered by the lower court); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980) (not mentioning
laches). But see O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 883 (Handler, J., dissenting) (noting that equitable defenses
such as laches "may be raised").
115. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 22 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "accrue"). This period is set by
statute in both adverse possession and statutes of limitations cases and is an issue of fact in laches
cases. See id. at 891 (defining "laches"); 16 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §
91.01 [2] (Matthew Bender & Co. 2009) (discussing adverse possession).
116. See I JESSICA L. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT, ARCHITECTURE AND MUSEUM LAW § 2:65
(2008) (citing Guggenheim Found., 569 N.E.2d 426).
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mail room employee in the late 1960s.117 The museum first learned that
it no longer had possession of the painting in 1969 or 1970 during a de-
cennial inventory.1 18 However, it did not report the painting as lost or
stolen because the museum was following a policy against publicizing art
theft.1 19 Later it was learned that Rachel Lubell had purchased the paint-
ing in 1967 from a gallery and displayed it in her home.1 20 She pled stat-
ute of limitations and laches defenses when the museum sued in 
1987.121
The court first drew a distinction between two types of subsequent
possessors: good faith purchasers and thieves. Possession by good faith
purchasers is not considered wrongful, so an action against a good faith
purchaser does not accrue until a demand for return is made and re-
fused. 122 As a consequence, the demand and refusal rule applies in this
situation, and the statute of limitations is tolled until the true owner
makes a request for return. In contrast, possession by a thief is wrongful
from the time of the theft. Thus, an action against a thief accrues imme-
diately, and the statute of limitations is never tolled "even if the property
owner was unaware of the theft at the time that it occurred."'
123
The Guggenheim court considered three alternatives to the demand
and refusal rule. First, it considered imposing a due diligence require-
ment on owners of stolen property, but rejected this rule as an undue
burden on victims of art theft. 124 Second, the court considered letting the
statute of limitations run from the time of the theft, regardless of who is
in possession, or from the time the possessor acquired the object. 125 The
court rejected this alternative as well, stating that "it would not be pru-
dent to extend that case law and impose the additional duty of diligence
before the true owner has reason to know where its missing chattel is to
117. Guggenheim Found., 569 N.E.2d at 427. A gouche is "an opaque watercolor paint which
usually has a pliable adhesive with the binder to retard drying." ELEANOR C. MUNRO, THE GOLDEN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ART 271 (1961).
118. Guggenheim Found., 569 N.E.2d at 428.
119. Id. at 431. The museum believed publicizing art theft would be detrimental to the recov-
ery of the stolen pieces and encourages additional theft attempts. Id.
120. Id. at 427. Lubell and her husband purchased the painting from the Robert Elkon Gallery
for less than ten percent of its estimated 1991 value. Id. at 428. The gallery's own records indicate
the gouache had come from the "private collection" of the mail room clerk suspected of the theft. Id.
While on display at the Gallery, a transparency was given to Sotheby's for an auction estimate and
the gouache was identified as one missing from the Guggenheim collection. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 429. Good faith purchasers are sometimes called bona fide purchasers.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 429-30. The court, however, did not reject this avenue of argument entirely, stating
that Lubell's "contention that the museum did not exercise reasonable diligence in locating the paint-
ing will be considered by the Trial Judge in the context of her laches defense." Id. at 431.
125. Id. at 430.
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be found."' 126 Third, the court considered the discovery rule, but rejected
it because the governor had previously vetoed a bill that would have
made the discovery rule New York law. 1
27
Adopting the demand and refusal rule, the Court of Appeals justi-
fied its decision in
recognition that New York enjoys a worldwide reputation as a pre-
eminent cultural center. To place the burden of locating stolen art-
work on the true owner and to foreclose the rights of that owner to
recover its property if the burden is not met would, we believe, en-
courage illicit trafficking in stolen art.'
28
In the court's opinion, tolling the statute of limitations when the ob-
ject was possessed by a good faith purchaser achieved two goals. First, it
placed the burden on purchasers to investigate the provenance of their
purchases, 129 and second, it protected owners who have a different ap-
proach to law and order than the traditional one.
30
The demand and refusal rule's shortcoming is that it does not give
purchasers of cultural property clear guidance on what actions they
should take at the time of acquisition. By tolling the statute of limita-
tions until the possessor has knowingly acted wrongly, the demand and
refusal rule functions in the same way as the knowingly adverse element
of adverse possession,' 3' a doctrine that exists to discourage idleness and
waste rather than encourage security of title.1 2 The doctrine will protect
a thief by looking at her actions when she acquired title because she is
knowingly adverse to the legitimate owner at that time. However, it will
not protect a good faith purchaser because, although she acted with dili-
gence when acquiring title, that same diligence precludes her from satis-
fying the knowingly adverse element. 3 3 While its goal was to give vic-
tims of theft strong protection, the court, by adopting the demand and
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 431.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. The elements of adverse possession are possession that is continuous, exclusive, open,
notorious, and hostile to the owner. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 59 (8th ed. 2004). Alternative
elements are "(1) hostile (perhaps under a claim of right); (2) exclusive; (3) open and notorious; (4)
actual; and (5) continuous for the requisite statutory period." 16 POWELL, supra note 115, §
91.01[2]. Another alternative is "hostile, actual, visible, exclusive, and continuous." O'Keeffe v.
Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 870 (N.J. 1980).
132. 16 POWELL, supra note 115, § 91.01[4].
133. The Court of Appeals observed that the distinction between thieves and good faith pur-
chasers that treats thieves more generously was "seemingly anomalous," but it is consistent when
viewed as a question of knowing adversity to the owner. Guggenheim Found., 569 N.E.2d at 429.
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refusal rule, provided purchasers with little guidance and, consequently,
weak protection.
2. The Discovery Rule
The leading case on the discovery rule is O 'Keeffe v. Snyder, a New
Jersey case involving the disappearance of three small Georgia O'Keeffe
paintings from O'Keeffe's husband's gallery, An American Place.
134
The facts are similar to Guggenheim. O'Keeffe, who completed the
paintings sometime prior to 1946, noticed they were not among the gal-
lery's collection, failed to immediately report them as stolen, located
them at a much later date, and sued for replevin.' 35 Barry Snyder, who
purchased the paintings from Ulrich Frank in 1975, traced his title
through Frank's deceased father. 136 Frank himself testified to seeing the
paintings in his father's apartment as early as 1941-43.137
Again, the issue was whether the statute of limitations barred
O'Keeffe's replevin action. The Supreme Court of New Jersey recog-
nized the problem with good faith purchasers' status: a good faith pur-
chaser is actually more vulnerable to a replevin claim than a thief be-
cause the statute of limitations begins to run immediately upon acquisi-
tion to protect a thief but only at some later date to protect a good faith
purchaser. 138 The court did not wish to punish owners who purchased in
good faith, and adopted the discovery rule.' 39 The discovery rule tolls
the statute of limitations only until a reasonably diligent owner should
have discovered the possessor of her property. 140 The court found that
the discovery rule was more equitable because it "shifts the emphasis
from the conduct of the possessor to the conduct of the owner."'
' 4 1
By focusing on the legitimate owner's conduct, the discovery rule
provides only slightly more protection to innocent purchasers than the
demand and refusal rule. This is because a purchase must be made in
good faith for the statute of limitations to apply; 142 the purchaser earns
134. OKeeffe, 416 A.2d at 865.
135. Id. at 865-66.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 866.
138. Id. at 867-68.
139. Id. at 869.
140. Id. It is the "should have" language that concerned the New York Court of Appeals.
Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991). The court did not
want to force all owners of art to act in the same manner. Id. at 431.
141. OKeeffe, 416 A.2d at 872.
142. The court held that there were three findings of fact the trial court must engage in to de-
termine whether the plaintiff, O'Keeffe, would benefit from the discovery rule:
(1) whether O'Keeffe used due diligence to recover the painting at the time of the alleged
theft and thereafter; (2) whether at the time of the alleged theft there was an effective
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good faith status by diligently researching the provenance of the piece
she is acquiring.1 43 This emphasis protects a good faith purchaser be-
cause placing the diligence requirement on the owner makes it more
likely that the good faith purchaser will uncover the cultural object's
status when doing due diligence. However, the good faith purchaser is
still not given clear guidance on what to look for when acquiring title-
something the New Jersey court recognized but did not rectify.1 44 New
Jersey tried to give purchasers of cultural property more ability to act
knowingly when acquiring these objects, but it still did not make clear
what actions they are supposed to take to protect themselves.
IV. CONSISTENT REGULATION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
With the inconsistent treatment of cultural property by U.S. law es-
tablished, this Part proposes a two-part solution to bring consistency to
U.S. law. This consistency can be achieved by, first, replacing the good
faith system for resolving ownership disputes with a provenance-based
system, and second, removing the legal distinction between illegally ex-
ported and stolen cultural property.
A. Part One of the Proposal: Provenance as the
Measure of Ownership
Disputes between purported owners of cultural property should be
settled by comparing the quality of each claimant's provenance, or chain
of title, and awarding legal title and possession to the stronger claimant.
Using provenance to perfect title would work with all types of cultural
property because the unifying characteristic of these objects is that in-
formation is available regarding the objects' origins. 145 This characteris-
tic both distinguishes cultural property from most other personal property
(a pair of shoes is typically not worth any more or less if its origins are
unknown) and also defines when an ordinary piece of personal property
becomes an object of cultural value (like the ruby slippers from The Wiz-
ard ofOz).1
46
method, other than talking to her colleagues, for O'Keeffe to alert the art world; and (3)
whether registering paintings with the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc. or any
other organization would put a reasonably prudent purchaser of art on constructive notice
that someone other than the possessor was the true owner.
Id. at 870. Because O'Keeffe had registered the paintings with the ADAA, the third question essen-
tially asks whether Snyder was a good faith purchaser. Id. at 866, 873.
143. Id. at 885.
144. See id. at 872.
145. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 8, pmbl.
146. "The ruby slippers wom by Judy Garland during the filming of 'The Wizard of Oz' are
truly a treasure of American history. They have fascinated people for years and evoke many strong
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The unique value of each piece of cultural property is similar to the
non-fungible nature of real property, and a provenance-based system
would function much like a land title record does today. In the United
States, a title-recording system tracks ownership interests in land. Under
recording statutes, any time an interest in land is created or destroyed,
documentation of that transaction is submitted to a recorder's office.
14 7
Prospective purchasers can then view the records of a piece of land to
determine the legitimacy of the title they are purchasing.1 48 The system
would encourage owners of cultural property to document each transfer
or use of an object and retain those documents just as recording acts do
for real property.1 49 While the proposed system would not create a re-
corder's office for cultural property, it would operate under a similar
principle by using the documentation each claimant could produce to
determine the true owner. Such documents could include a bill of sale,
export permit, or insurance policy.
The new rules could be applied prospectively to all cultural prop-
erty, but would require a grandfather clause for past transactions where a
reasonable buyer would not expect the need to demonstrate provenance.
Even first possessors would have some documentation of their legitimate
ownership, such as an excavation permit for an artifact or the artist's sig-
nature on a work of art. The rule would have to include an exception for
owners who would not have reasonably been expected to produce prove-
nance documentation to earn good faith purchaser status. This would
include, for example, owners of objects of minor value because these
individuals would not reasonably demand such documentation prior to
passage of a provenance statute. Also, an owner whose possession pre-
dated the UNESCO Convention's requirement that all countries create an
export certificate for cultural property might have cultural objects from
foreign countries that reasonably lack any provenance. Such exceptions,
however, have the potential to consume the benefits of a provenance-
based system and must be narrowly tailored.
Once implemented, the system would be easy to apply. In the event
of a conflict, each owner would present her documentation and many
cases could be decided on summary judgment. In situations where
documentation was incomplete or ambiguous and where the pleadings
emotions .... National Museum of American History, "Treasures of American History" FAQs,
http://americanhistory.si.edu/about/faq.cfmkey-55&faqkey 136#1 (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
147. 14 POWELL, supra note 115, § 83.02[l].
148. Id.
149. Note the similarities between the documents that would be compiled during a land title
search and with this Comment's proposed provenance records. See id. § 82.01[4].
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claimed undocumented transactions, 150 a trial would be required. In ei-
ther case, the party whose documentation showed her rightful claim
would win title.
1. Provenance Is More Transparent Than Good Faith
Unlike a provenance system, a system based on good faith status
does not provide sufficient protection to either legitimate owners or good
faith purchasers when a dispute arises. By allowing a good faith pur-
chaser to gain superior title over an innocent victim of theft, the law puts
theft victims in a vulnerable position. By requiring a good faith inquiry,
the law also puts purchasers at risk for not meeting the court's standard.
A provenance-based system would put all parties on advance notice re-
garding the requirements necessary to perfect their interests. For an il-
lustration, consider two cases.
First, consider the events leading up to United States v. Schultz.151
In Schultz, the defendants developed an elaborate cover, the "Thomas
Alcock Collection," through which they forged provenance for Egyptian
antiquities. 152 In 1991, one of the defendants, Jonathan Tokeley Parry,
smuggled Egyptian artifacts out of Egypt by coating them in plastic so
they would appear to be cheap collectables 153 He brought them to Eng-
land, where he removed the plastic coating and restored the artifacts us-
ing a popular 1920s restoration technique. 154  Parry and Frederick
Schultz then concocted a story that a relative of Parry's, "Thomas Al-
cock," had brought the artifacts out of Egypt in the 1920s and had kept
them in his private collection ever since. 155 The scheme was eventually
uncovered, and the men were arrested and charged with dealing in stolen
antiquities. 156
Under the current system, a purchaser from Schultz's collection
would not reasonably expect to find any documentation about the piece
of cultural property because it would predate the UNESCO Convention's
permit requirement and, according to Schultz's story, would have no sale
documents because it was discovered by "Alcock." If the purchaser had
the object inspected or appraised, the purchaser would be told that the
piece was genuine and had been restored in a fashion consistent with its
150. Unlike land, personal property is not generally covered by the Statute of Frauds. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1981).
151. 333 F.3d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir. 2003).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 396.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 398.
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purported origins. 57 Under either the demand and refusal or discovery
rules, this hypothetical purchaser could take no action that would protect
her interest in the artifact. On the other hand, Egypt, the legitimate
owner, would have to prove diligent search under the discovery rule and
would have a running statute of limitations against Schultz.
By contrast, under a provenance system, a purchaser would know
of the potential defect in title when she purchased the artifact and could
adjust her behavior accordingly. A purchaser could either refuse to buy
the object or discount her offer based on any perceived flaw in title.
Egypt would also be protected because it would have stronger prove-
nance through its own patrimony laws and evidence of the artifact's ori-
gin. 158 Egypt would be able to recover its property in a civil action, and a
hypothetical purchaser would have a civil claim against the seller.
Provenance is sometimes used to prove ownership under the current
good faith system, but if it was adopted as the primary measure of title,
purchasers would know exactly what to look for and how to protect
themselves. Such a situation arose in An Original Manuscript.159 Duane
Douglas bought a manuscript at a flea market in Mexico City in 1992.60
After smuggling the manuscript into the United States, Douglas at-
tempted to sell the manuscript to Dana Toft. 16 ' Douglas made represen-
tations to Toft about the manuscript, and Toft decided to purchase it for
$16,000.162 The bill of sale for the transaction stated that the manuscript
"was part of the Sanchez-Flores collection between 1925 and 1972 at
which time it was disbursed."'' 63 Because of Toft's later attempts to sell
the manuscript, a buyer sent an inquiry to the Mexican National Ar-
chives, which identified the manuscript as belonging to the Californias
collection.164  At the request of the Mexican government, the United
States instituted proceedings under the CPIA.1
65
The court found Toft lacked good faith because he was willfully
blind toward the nature of the manuscript, 66 and the court granted sum-
157. Fundamentally the same issues exist in terms of fine art. See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Snyder,
416 A.2d 862, 865-66 (N.J. 1980). Snyder's father apparently had possession of the paintings not
long after they were created. Id. at 866. O'Keeffe was not yet so famous that the purchaser would
have been expected to carefully document his purchase.
158. See Schultz, 333 F.3d at 398-99.
159. United States v. An Original Manuscript Dated Nov. 19, 1778, No. 96 Civ. 6221, 1999
WL 97894 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 22, 1999).
160. Id. at *1.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *1, 2.
163. Id. at *2.
164. Id. at *1, 2.
165. Id. at *3.
166. Id. at *7.
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mary judgment on the forfeiture claim. 167  In reaching that conclusion,
the court partially relied on the total lack of provenance surrounding the
manuscript. 168  Toft received representations from Douglas about the
provenance of the manuscript, but did not request any documentation or
seek further information about how it came into Douglas' possession.
169
Under the good faith standard, Toft had no defense.
Under a provenance system, Toft would have known to ask for
documentation regarding the manuscript's time in the Californias collec-
tion, its sale, and its UNESCO-mandated export permit from the Mexi-
can government. Using provenance as proof of title would have given
both parties clear guidance on how to protect their property interests.
2. Provenance Is More Functional than a Stolen Property Registry
The leading alternative to good faith is the creation of a database of
stolen cultural property. 170  A stolen art registry would require the vic-
tims of cultural property theft to report the loss of their property and
would require the purchasers of cultural property to check the registry
before completing their transactions. 17 1 The registry would force the
marketplace to adjust because failure to participate would, generally,
have serious adverse consequences.112 A registry has the benefit of pro-
viding a quick and reliable way to check the legitimacy of any transac-
tion before it goes through and is technically possible. 73 However, when
a registry is compared to a provenance-based system, there are three
clear disadvantages.
167. Id. at *8.
168. Id. at *7. Other factors were that the sale to Toft took place in a hotel room and that the
transaction was all cash. Id.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (N.J. 1980); Hawkins et al., supra note
7, at 87-89. Both the New Jersey Supreme Court and Ashton Hawkins, former Executive Vice
President and Counsel to the Trustees of The Metropolitan Museum of Art, support converting an
existing private database of stolen cultural property into an official one. The New Jersey court rec-
ognized this was beyond its limited power and adopted the discovery rule as the best available alter-
native. O 'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872. Mr. Hawkins advocates for a similar system in his article. Haw-
kins et al., supra note 7, at 88-89.
171. Mr. Hawkins' registry would protect only purchasers who "registered their stolen art soon
after the theft with both law enforcement and the registry" and would grant good faith status and
statute of limitations protections automatically to any purchaser who checked the registry and did not
find the piece they were purchasing there. Hawkins et al., supra note 7, at 90.
172. Owners who did not participate in Mr. Hawkins' registry would have the statute of limita-
tions on their claims run from the time of the theft regardless of who was in possession; purchasers
who did not check the registry would automatically be considered to have failed to exercise good
faith. Id. at 90-91.
173. See OKeeffe, 416 A.2d at 872.
[Vol. 32:943
2009] Protecting Cultural Property Through Provenance 965
First, provenance is already valued because it is central to academic
work and to academic use of cultural property. 174 Archeologists depend
upon the preservation of provenance for their work-once an artifact is
removed from the site in which it is discovered, its context is lost and a
large portion of the "wealth of knowledge that is often imparted by the
art"'175 is permanently destroyed. Furthermore, the Society of Profes-
sional Archaeologists directs its members to publish the information
gathered from any excavation within ten years, ensuring the knowledge
is preserved and shared. 176 Archaeological ethics ban publications which
refer to items lacking complete provenance.
77
Second, a registry would require a drastic shift in how the cultural
property market functions. Implementing a stolen art registry would first
require all currently unrecovered objects be identified and reported.1
7 8
Buyers and sellers would have to consult the registry as part of every
transaction, creating additional costs. A mandatory registry would also
be a peculiarity in the law: there is no similar treatment of victims in any
other area. 79
Market practices and other areas of law are both more consistent
with a provenance-based system. The system allows for compromise
treatment for cultural property, somewhere between the treatment af-
forded to personal and to real property. Cultural property shares its non-
fungible nature with real property, while still being a type of personal
property.
174. Archaeological Institute of America (AIA) publications "will not serve for the announce-
ment or initial scholarly presentation of any object in a private or public collection acquired after
December 30, 1973, unless its existence is documented before that date, or it was legally exported
from the country of origin." Publication Policy for AJA and Archaeology, http://www.archaeologic
al.org/webinfo.php?page=10040 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). An exception may be made if, in the
view of the Editor, the aim of publication is to emphasize the loss of archaeological context. Id.
175. Id.
176. THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ARCHAEOLOGISTS CODE OF ETHICS § 6.3 (1995), re-
printed in ARCHAEOLOGICAL ETHICS app. A at 257 (Karen D. Vitelli ed., 1996).
177. For example, the AIA instructs its members to "[r]efuse to participate in the illegal trade
in antiquities derived from excavation in any country after December 30, 1970, when the AIA Coun-
cil endorsed the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Property, and refrain from activities that enhance
the commercial value of such objects .... ARCHAEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF AMERICA CODE OF
ETHICS 2 (1990), reprinted in ARCHAEOLOGICAL ETHICS, supra note 176, app. A at 261. See also
KEVIN GREENE, ARCHAEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 274 (4th ed. 2002) ("Public museums have a
better record today for refusing to purchase items that lack proper documentation about their origins
and ownership ... ").
178. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
179. Compare Hawkins et al., supra note 7, at 90 (proposed stolen art registry), with 14
POWELL, supra note 115, § 82.03. Indeed, mandatory reporting is the very type of change the New
York Court of Appeals wanted to avoid, and which the Guggenheim Museum resisted. Solomon R.
Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991).
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Unlike a stolen property registry, a provenance-based claim to title
already has a running start-many involved in the cultural property mar-
ket already highly value provenance information. 180  Therefore, this
Comment's proposal can be implemented immediately and have an im-
mediate effect on the clarity of title. While a limited exemption would
be necessary for some past transactions, the scope of this immediate pro-
tection is still much greater than with a stolen property registry. Certain
transactions predating enactment that did not reasonably include prove-
nance information would be exempted, but types of property for which
provenance is most important-such as objects of historic significance-
would already have some records. Further, transaction costs would not
be an issue because documenting transactions with, for example, a bill of
sale, an export permit, or a license to excavate, can be done without in-
volving additional actions.18'
Third, a stolen property registry is not capable of protecting all sto-
len cultural objects. To list an item in a stolen property registry, that
item must have been in the physical custody of an owner who both
knows that her property has been stolen and is in a position to report the
theft to the registry. 182 Any other item would be unprotected. 183 Such a
registry would not protect yet-to-be discovered artifacts from pillage and
sale on the black market. Even if the government of the country from
where the objects were pillaged had a law claiming ownership of all un-
discovered cultural property, it could not register the theft of objects it
did not know existed. 184 In this hypothetical, the country of origin is the
legitimate owner but is unaware of the object's existence, let alone its
theft, and is therefore unable to register it.
A system that uses provenance records as proof of title would better
protect previously unidentified cultural property. Under a provenance-
based system, an artifact that was recently discovered by a looter would
180. See Publication Policy for AJA and Archaeology, supra note 174 and accompanying text.
See Hawkins et al., supra note 7, at 88 (conceding that a stolen art registry could not have an imme-
diate effect).
181. A provenance-based system could additionally be viewed as a first step toward a registra-
tion system similar to the land title registration system present in most states. This system would not
require the radical shift in how cultural property is bought and sold that a registry would, and the
system would recognize that cultural property occupies a peculiar position in property regulation.
See Hawkins et al., supra note 7, at 89. If a registry is desired after enactment of a provenance-
based system, one could easily be created by allowing owners to upload copies of their provenance
documents onto a searchable Internet database.
182. See id
183. See id.
184. See, e.g., John Noble Wilford, High in Andes, a Place That May Have Been Incas' Last
Refuge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2002, at F5, available at http://nytimes.com/2002/03/19/science/high-
in-andes-a-place-that-may-have-been-incas-last-refuge.html.
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appear identical to a potential purchaser to an artifact that was stolen-
both would lack proper provenance. While this might not be an idea for
tracking down looters, the purpose of provenance is to demonstrate that
the seller has no legal interest in the object, only bare possession. By
contrast, objects which had been legitimately discovered and allowed to
enter the market by the appropriate government would be documented.
A provenance-based system would protect a wider variety of objects.
B. Part Two of the Proposal: Import Controls
Using provenance to resolve disputes between legitimate owners
and current possessors will give purely domestic transactions the in-
creased transparency necessary to protect both purchasers and victims of
theft. But alone, the provenance-based system will not bring the same
desired effect to transactions in international commerce. As a major art-
importing country, U.S. law must necessarily confront the international
trade in cultural property and provide those purchasers with the same
degree of protection.
Cultural property that is illegally exported from another country
and brought to the United States should be treated identically to cultural
property that was stolen abroad before being brought into the United
States. This would end the United States' dependence on foreign coun-
tries' interpretation of laws protecting their cultural property, and would
make provenance the full measure of title.
If cultural property continues being separated into "illegally ex-
ported" and "stolen" classifications, its provenance will not fully reflect
the object's legal status. Provenance identifies legally imported property
because it has export documentation which distinguishes it from stolen
and illegally exported property, 185 but the provenances of stolen and ille-
gally exported property are indistinguishable from one another because
both acts take place without documentation. Provenance would not show
the relevant legal status of title because the two acts receive different
treatment under the current law.' 
86
Eliminating this distinction would make U.S. law more consistent
because domestic law would function without regard to foreign law clas-
sifications. It would bring consistency to what is already the foreign pol-
icy of the United States: "U.S. actions in these complex matters should
not be bound by the characterization of other countries, and these coun-
185. See, e.g., UNESCO Convention, supra note 8, art. 6 (requiring parties to create a certifi-
cate identifying that an object was exported in conformation with the party's laws).
186. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996 (5th Cir. 1977). See also supra Parts
III.B-D.
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tries should have the benefit of knowing what minimum showing is re-
quired to obtain the full range of U.S. cooperation.'
87
The United States has a "profound national interest in joining other
countries to control the trafficking of [cultural property] in international
commerce,"1 88 an interest derived from the country's growing acceptance
of cultural internationalist norms. 189 When considering the CPIA, the
Senate recognized that the current inconsistencies are a real policy con-
cern to art-exporting nations, and that the country's reputation was being
harmed by the poor domestic response to the frequent appearance of sto-
len and looted cultural property in the United States. 190
Removal of this distinction would improve transparency and pre-
dictability in both criminal and civil law. The NSPA does not apply to
property illegally exported from, but not stolen in, a foreign jurisdiction.
This limitation handicaps the United States' response to the outrage of its
sister countries. 191 A more comprehensive ban on illegally obtained cul-
tural property will enhance the law's general deterrent function and en-
able foreign nations to more freely protect their property.
The Executive Branch would also have more freedom to make pol-
icy decisions by treating "stolen" and "illegally exported" property iden-
tically. As the law stands now, illegally exported property is not "stolen"
under the NSPA, 192 even though it was taken from another country in
violation of their export laws. Additionally, "U.S. action" is sometimes
"bound by the characterization of other countries" against Congress's
wishes 193 when the executive cannot pursue prosecution to recover cul-
tural property because of the state of foreign law.'
94
Removing the distinction between "stolen" and "illegally exported"
cultural property would further the goal of predictability for all actors in
the cultural property market. It would remove a distinction between two
foreign law violations and result in two classes of objects which will
187. S. REP. No. 97-564, at 27 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4104 (empha-
sis added).
188. S. REP. No. 97-564, at 23, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4100.
189. See supra Parts III.A-C.
190. S. REP. No. 97-564, at 23, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4100 (quoting comments submitted by
the Department of State); see also Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1376 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff d, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.
1990).
191. The UNESCO Convention recognizes the value of "national cultural heritage" when it
obligates signatory nations to set up services to protect such objects from export when that would
damage its heritage. UNESCO Convention, supra note 8, art. 5.
192. See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
193. S. REP. No. 97-564, at 27, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4104.
194. See, e.g., McClain, 545 F.2d at 1000-01.
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likely appear indistinguishable to a potential purchaser, allowing her to
make a fully-informed decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The theft of cultural property is a pervasive problem that U.S. law
does not adequately address. The international community has con-
demned such thefts for hundreds of years, but international law alone
cannot solve the problem. Unfortunately, while the United States is the
leading market for cultural property, it has failed to adequately respond.
While there have been many laws passed on the subject since the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, they have led not to blanket coverage, but
only a patchwork of protection.
Domestically, cultural property is best protected by the CPIA, the
NSPA, and common law remedies, but each has its weaknesses. Al-
though the CPIA lays out a clear national policy proscribing the illegal
trade in cultural property, it applies only to property imported from cer-
tain nations. The NSPA, on the other hand, applies to property generally,
but does not reach all cultural property because it applies only to prop-
erty which was "stolen." Finally, the common law is inconsistent from
state to state and does not enable those in the art market to buy with cer-
tainty. Reform is needed to correct this imbalance. This Comment pro-
poses treating all those who come into possession of cultural property
equally by evaluating their claims on grounds of provenance and by re-
moving the distinction between "illegally exported" and "stolen" cultural
property.
By requiring owners of cultural property to keep detailed prove-
nance regarding their property, buyers will be better able to evaluate the
title they are purchasing, and dealers in stolen property will be ferreted
out. Cultural objects as well as their provenance will be better protected
and valued because it will be in the interests of all those who come into
possession of cultural objects to ensure clear provenance. The same val-
ues are advanced by ending the distinction between "illegally exported"
and "stolen" property because both are likely to appear similar to a pur-
chaser and should be treated the same to allow her to act with the maxi-
mum amount of relevant information.
Because so much of the regulation is dependent upon federal law,
Congress could efficiently reform this entire area of law. The reforms
proposed in this Comment can be easily and immediately enacted, bring-
ing immediate and profound benefit to cultural property regulation.
